Playing According to Your Bankroll

In poker, particularly NL Hold Em, the size of your stack should alter the way you play. Similarly, the size of your bankroll should alter your overall strategy for playing.

Game selection is the biggest thing your bankroll should dictate. Because of the nature of poker, you will lose. It is inevitable. You can play perfectly, and you can still lose. Sometimes it's just a hand and you recover, sometimes it is multiple hands over a session, sometimes it can be multiple sessions. You have to determine how much you are willing to lose on a given night or in a given sequence of sessions. If your bankroll is $5,000, you could play in a $1,000 game, but you can't lose 5 times. That puts a lot of pressure on you to play well, and it puts pressure on the cards to turn out well. A $5,000 roll at a $500 table means 10 losses, or half the pressure. At a $300 table, it's about 17 losing sessions. There is more of an opportunity to make money at larger tables. One hot streak of cards coupled with great play and your bankroll skyrockets. However, the cards cool off at the drop of a hat and without warning, and nobody plays perfectly all the time. You have to assess the risk you're taking and then go from there.

Your bankroll dictates your strategy for playing. If you have a $5,000 roll and you're playing at a $100 table, you can screw around, play pot odds and implied odds, take chances with big bluffs, and so on. However, if it is only $2,000, you have to tighten up and take fewer chances.

Poker is a war, your chips are your soldiers on the field. Your bankroll is your army as a whole. It's stupid to commit your entire army to one battle (See: Battle of the Bulge, Stalingrad, and Pharsulus). It is also stupid to have reckless strategies with a small army.

My style of poker, at the moment, is based on two men. Phil Hellmuth Jr. and Robert E. Lee. I use Hellmuth's top 10 strategy for hand selection, and his willingness to fold, even if he might be winning, and his conservativeness without the nuts.

Robert E. Lee, as you may or may not know, was the commanding General of the Army of Northern Virginia in the American Civil War. His army was almost always outnumbered by Union forces, and always with inferior supplies. However, he was able keep his army intact for 4 years of warfare and came very close to winning the war at the battle of Gettysburg. He picked his spots and his strategy was to maintain the survival of his army. He rarely went into battle unless he had an edge. Of course, he and the Confederacy lost the war, but a great deal of that was due to the way Gettysburg turned out. Lee took a gamble and went on the offensive against an enemy with superior ground. He could have forced the enemy to engage him in better spot, but he went for the killer blow instead of trying to set up the perfect situation.

A really good player at Turning Stone once said to me "You're a really good player, but I never see you with a huge stack of chips, it's always like $150 or $200." And he's right, I rarely have monstrous stacks of chips unless I've been playing all day and all night. There's a reason for that.

I rarely play hands that win big pots. My goal, because my bankroll isn't high enough to absorb many losses, is to win a sizable pot an hour. Big pots are great, and I take them when I can. The pots I win though, are typically mid-sized ones, somewhere between $15 and $40 at a $100 table. My bankroll simply can't afford to take steady streams of losses with suited connectors and low pocket pairs. I've tried that style, and the pots I won were larger, but I was also losing a lot of bets and calls. A bad week or two of that and my bankroll was hurting.

If my bankroll were higher, let's say around $3,000 or $4,000, I'd probably take more chances at the $100 table, and I'd definitely move up to $200. When my bankroll gets up to around $10,000, watch the fuck out cuz I'm going to be playing a Ulysses S. Grant style of poker at the lower tables. However, I'll still play Robert E. Lee poker at the higher ones.

Unfortunately, Phil Hellmuth has busted out of the WSOP Main Event. The crapshoot will continue without him.

Hellmuth Wins 10th Bracelet

Last night, Hellmuth claimed the $1,000 NL Hold Em w/re-buys. Phil entered the final day of the event with 770,000 in chips and about a 300,000 chip lead over the next highest stack. Tony G was eliminated with Q2 against Elio Cabrera's AT. Ralph Perry and Phil Hellmuth jawed at each other about displaying cards. Perry raised with 99, Hellmuth moved all-in with JJ, and Perry called. Hellmuth spiked a Jack and knocked out Perry in 8th.

David "C4" Plastik was short-stacked and moved all-in with Jacks. Hellmuth called him with Aces and knocked Plastik out in 7th place. Hellmuth got very lucky on a big hand. He flopped top pair, but was up against the nut straight. However, he caught runner runner flush to knock out Elio Cabrera in 6th place. Hellmuth stated to all at the tournament: "I just want everyone to know that Elio completely outplayed me on that hand. You deserved that one much more than I did. I got lucky."

Online player Terris Preston was knocked out in 5th place. Circuit Tournament winner John Spadavecchia tried stealing the blinds with Q8, but was called by Hellmuth with AT. The A-6-A flop knocked Spadavecchia out in 4th.

The final three were Hellmuth with 1.2 million in chips, Juha Helppi with 780,000 and Daryn Firicano with 500,000. After a few all-ins, the chip stacks were all about equal. Firicano was eliminated with KQ against Helppi's A8. The play was down to heads up with Helppi holding a 2 to 1 chip lead.

Hellmuth was whittled down and was forced to go all-in with 55 against Helppi's A6s. Hellmuth flopped the set, but Helppi flopped the nut flush draw. The turn gave Helppi the flush. The river paired the board to give Hellmuth a full boat and life in the tournament. The hand made the chip counts about even.

The action was forced when Helppi re-raised all-in with AT. Hellmuth instantly called with Kings and doubled up to take a commanding chip lead. The event was all but over. Helppi moved all-in with A9, Hellmuth called with AJ. Hellmuth's Ace-Jack high held up and he won his 10th bracelet along with over $600,000.

Hellmuth is once again tied for the most WSOP bracelets with 10. All of them are hold em events, 9 of them are No-Limit hold em events.

So far, the 2006 World Series has been the Phil Hellmuth show. He's had 6 cashes, 3 final tables, and a win. He is also on top of CardPlayer.com's WSOP Player of the Year standings.

I go to the casino and a lot of wannabe poker superstars claim that "Hellmuth isn't that good anymore" and that all his bracelets "were won when no-one played in the events." Well, this victory further disproves them. It also ends Phil's lengthy drought at major tournaments. Except for the 2005 Heads Up Tournament on NBC, Hellmuth hadn't won a major event since the 2003 World Series when he won $3,000 NL Hold Em.

Congratulations to Phil Hellmuth, the best No Limit player in the world right now.

The Poker in Rounders

Rounders is to poker players what Passion of the Christ is to Chrsitians. The thing I love about the movie is that all of the major plot points turn around poker. I'm a screenwriting student and a poker player so the combination of plot and poker is very enjoyable.

There are many hands of poker played in Rounders. The first one we see is the infamous Aces full vs. Nines full that busts Mike McDermott out of his entire bankroll.

The game is a $25,000 minimum no-limit hold em game. The blinds are probably somewhere around $50 and $100, perhaps higher. When The Hand occurs, the game is down to 4 players. Mike McDermott has Ace-9 suited on the button after the player under the gun folds.

McDermott raises to $500, which makes sense. He has a suited Ace on the button, which is a monster. Teddy KGB smooth calls with pocket Aces.

The flop is the 8 of clubs, 9 of spades, and Ace of spades. KGB checks the nuts, and McDermott bets $2,000. He claims it is an overbet, but it is only twice the size of the pot. KGB slyly and slowly calls. The pot is now somewhere in the $3,000 neighborhood. McDermott puts KGB on a flush draw. Why? Who knows.

The turn is the 9 of hearts, which gives both players a full boat. Teddy KGB's is higher and McDermott is drawing to one out, the 9 of diamonds. They both check.

The river is the 6 of spades, apparently giving Teddy KGB a flush. Teddy bets $15,000, or 5 times the pot. Now THAT is an overbet. McDermott thinks he has the best hand, acts weakly, then pushes all in for $33,000 more. KGB, of course, calls with Aces full and destroys Mike McDermott.

Now, asking McDermott to be good enough to fold 9s full is a bit much. I don't think too many players could do that. However, the entire hand, KGB seems to be acting weak but is actually strong. He smooth calls McDermott's preflop raise, and flop bet, then he bets 5 times the pot on the river. Either he's bluffing or he's got a fucking monstrous hand. It isn't totally out of the question for McDermott to just call the $15,000 on the river. If he just calls it and wins, he still makes $17,500 in the hand, which would make his stack $66,000. If he just calls and loses, he's at $33,000. Either way, he's up on his night.

The main problem with McDermott's gameplay at KGB's place is that he put his entire bankroll into play. You simply don't do that. Not even if you were a perfect poker player and always knew what the cards were should you do that. What if you have Aces against Kings, both go all-in and you lose? With hands like AA vs. KK, you lose about 17% of the time. Is it worth your entire bankroll (in Mike's case, also his tuition)? NO!!!!

The two biggest card games in the movie are No Limit Hold Em games, but most games are stud games. On the commentary by Phil Hellmuth, Johnny Chan, Chris Ferguson, and Chris Moneymaker, they remark how stud seems to be a bigger game on the East Coast when Rounders was made compared to Texas Hold Em. This is confirmed by Wikipedia, and by some of the old time dealers I've talked to at Turning Stone who have worked in Vegas. Stud is definitely not a big west coast game, but once was THE game in the East. Nowadays, finding large stud games is difficult outside of Foxwoods and Atlantic City. Typically, Turning Stone only has a meek 1-5 stud game going. Online, Party Poker has $30/$60 for its biggest stud game, whereas Hold Em can be as high as $5000 max buy-in NL hold em, or $100/$200 limit hold em. Even Omaha has eclipsed 7 card stud.

The scene at the Taj in which the New York rounders take down tourists is one of my favorite scenes. It's funny, and it rings true. I typically go to Turning Stone by myself, but a good number of regular players there know me and a few are about the closest thing you can get to a friend at the poker table. We don't collude, and we will take each other down if the situation occurs, but we will often stay out of each other's way. The smart players there know I'm tight and to stay out of my way, and I know some players there are tight and I should stay out of their way. The Taj scene also includes one of my favorite lines "Down here for a good time, why not give poker a try?" and of course: "It's like the nature channel, you don't see piranhas eating each other."

In the golf club game, there is an obvious string bet. String betting is something that needs to be wiped off the face of the earth at all costs. Since all bets are verbally binding, saying the words "call" and then "raise" is a contradiction. The first bet is binding and it is completed then. The same can be said if a player pushes out a bet, raise, or call, then decides to put more into the pot. McDermott should have called a string bet on the player. Even if he loses the pot, he has an infinitely higher chance to win if the pot is called as opposed to him folding.

The Johnny Chan hand always bugged me. The situation is that McDermott is sitting at $300/$600 in Atlantic City with Johnny Chan. McDermott foolishly only puts $6,000 in front of him to play the game. For some reason he decides in a hand to outplay Chan.

McDermott says he played tight for an hour and folded, then with rags he made a score on Chan. In 300/600, the blinds are 150/300. In the hand in question, Chan raises to 600, McDermott re-raises 300 on top to 900. Chan re-raises to 1200. McDermott re-raises to 1500. Then Chan folds.

My problem is, why the fuck did Chan fold? For $300, Chan could have called McDermott and seen a flop. By the time Chan folds, the pot is already $3,150. Chan is getting laid 10.5 to 1 on his money. Furthermore, the implied odds are very good. With McDermott's minimal chip stack, he's committed himself almost entirely to this one hand. He's already put $1500 in there and will probably put in the remaining $4500. Unless Chan has something like King-2, and thinks McDermott has Kings, Chan should at least see a flop. And besides, what is $300 to Johnny fucking Chan?

The last hand of the movie, McDermott has 9-8 of spades and flops the nut straight. He checks it, pretending to be on a draw. Eventually, KGB goes broke on the hand.

McDermott could slow play because there were no other big draws out there. About the only hand drawing against him is 2 pair or a set. He could be up against a higher straight draw, but it would have to be a gutshot one with the 6-7-T flop. He also has an out for any gutshot straight draw higher than his. This is the perfect time to slow play. The turn is a blank, and it also ensures that no flush will come out. This means McDermott is 100% safe unless the board pairs or an 8 or 9 comes out. He has the nuts the entire time and slow plays it.

Slow playing, even with the nuts, is dangerous. You have to do it sometimes in order to make money. However, you are risking the outdraw, even if it is a freak outdraw like runner runner flush or someone hitting a full boat on you. Slow playing needs to be done with caution. Remember, the more you can win also means the more you can lose.

Finally, the biggest mistake made in the movie wasn't Chan folding when he's getting 20 to 1 implied odds, or McDermott putting his entire $30,000 bankroll on the line in one game, it was Mike McDermott refusing Petra's sexual advances. What the fuck was he thinking? I don't care if your girlfriend just left you and your best friend is borrowing money in your name, HOW THE FUCK COULD YOU TURN DOWN PETRA, PLAYED BY FAMKE JANSSEN?



How could Mike McDermott not want to go all-in there?

Benefits of Being Tight

Apart from protecting your stack and having steady chip increases, I've found that playing tight has had some added benefits.

1. Good players get out of your way. Anyone who has a poker IQ can spot a tight player. They fold a lot. So when a tight player is in a hand, the good players think twice about coming in. They also show serious respect for raises and bets from tight players. This eliminates competition against not-so-dominating hands like Ace-Queen or middle pocket pairs. The less competition these hands have, the more likely they will win. You don't want too much action from good players anyway. They're the ones who are most likely to beat you. You want the idiots in the hand.

2. Easier to know when you're beat. If you raise, and a good player calls you, or re-raises you, it is much easier to fold a hand like Ace-King or pocket Jacks. You just know you're beat if a smart player is going to re-raise a raise from a tight player like yourself.

3. Some people are morons and will give you too much action. Not so bright players will think that you'll fold if they push you hard enough. Sometimes this is true. A player can call a tight player's raise, bet the flop, and occasionally take it down. But he also runs a major risk of running into a monster. Many players foolishly equate tightness with weakness. This is dead wrong. A tight player can be weak, which is a bad way to play, but many players that are tight are smart enough to know how to be aggressive. In no-limit, all it takes is one major mistake, like bluffing hard into a monster, to lose all your chips. My motto is, "The poker table is my house. I'll let you push me around my house all day because eventually you're going to push me towards my gun rack and I'll blow you away." Perfect example:

A player raised under the gun to $7 at the $1/$2 table. I looked down at Aces so I re-raised quite strongly to $22. The button just didn't believe me or thought he could push me out. He re-raised me to $44. That's just beautiful right there. I went all-in and he called with pocket 7s. He didn't spike a set. God only knows what he was thinking.

4. Free cards. When a tight player is in a hand, especially if it's been raised, they will often get free cards out of fear. I can't tell you how many times I've gotten a free card with Big Slick because people think I have Jacks or better.

The other day, this guy raised with tens. A few other people called. I had Ace-King so I called. The flop was four blanks. I watched the initial raiser as he viewed the flop. He seemed to like it, then he looked at me and his face dropped. He checked the flop. I checked figuring he probably had something and might call a bet. All I had was Ace high. The river was a King. Now, when he was beat, he decided to bet. I raised when it got to me to see where I was. I found out when he folded. Out of fear, he gave me the free card that allowed my hand to beat his.

5. People play with less strength when a tight player is in a hand. Again, free cards and chances to bluff at the pot are massive when you're tight. I've won with strong hands that were beat preflop and postflop, but because the other players were afraid, they don't bet the flop to see where they are.

6. Semi-bluffing is a potential gold mine. Bluff with a flush draw or straight draw, then get action, then hit, and nobody thinks a tight player like yourself could have possibly bet with anything but a made hand so they don't put you on a flush or a straight.

7. Bluffing is easier AND cheaper. Again, this usually only matters against good players who have noticed you're tight. But it is so much easier to take down pots with a bluff if you have a tight reputation. You also don't have to make big bets and risk a lot of chips to make effective bluffs, since any time you throw chips into the pot, it gets treated with respect.

8. Nobody puts you on anything but premium starting hands. Once and awhile, I'll play a terrible starting hand like Queen-Ten or pocket crabs, for the explicit purpose that no one will have any clue that I've hit.

9. You can win without going to the flop. This sounds like a bad thing, but it isn't. Sometimes you want action with hands like AA or KK, but you can't mind winning small pots. They add up over time and keep your stack high enough to play and make money. Also, preflop pots are rarely raked. Someone raises, you re-raise, you can take it down right there. It's nice to win preflop because that is the moment when you're positive your hand is the best.

10. Taking down medium sized pots without hitting. Hands like AK and AQ only hit 1 out of 3 flops. As tight player, your bets are so much scarier, that you can win pots without winning races on the flop. Those medium sized pots are very nice and seriously add up over time.

Winning the Pot Without Winning the Race, Hellmuth Watch

I witnessed a hand online the other day that was impressive poker on one player's part, and unimpressive poker on another player's part. My friend was at the final table at a tournament, down to the final 3 players. He had about 350,000 in chips compared to his opponents 1.2 million. The blinds were 6,000/12,000 with 200 antes.

My friend was on the button was 33. He raised to about 37,000. The small blind called the raise, the big blind folded. The small blind had King-Queen. The flop was King, 6, Ace. The KQ had effectively won the race, and the pocket crabs were drawing to 2 outs.

The small blind made a mistake and bet out the minimum, 12,000 chips. The minimum bet into a pot of 86,000 chips made it quite clear that the small blind had hit the flop, but not very hard. My friend sensed weakness. Although he figured he was beat, he also figured he could win the pot with a bet. He raised to about 40,000 in chips. The other player thought about it, then called.

The call was a demonstration of weakness. Although the first bluff didn't work, the next one would most assuredly succeed. The turn was a Jack. The small blind checked. My friend with 33 bet out something his opponent couldn't call, a bet of about 120,000 chips. The bluff committed a great deal of his stack to the pot, which was a demonstration of strength. The opponent folded after deliberating.

My friend lost the coinflip, but won a big hand because he was aggressive. The opponent lost because he was passive. He called the raise preflop, only bet the minimum on the flop, called a raise, then checked the turn. At no point was he seriously aggressive, even though he had a chip lead of more than 3 to 1 against my friend.

Hellmuth Looking for Bracelet #10 (spoilers)
Phil Hellmuth Jr. finished 2nd in the $5,000 NL Hold Em Event in the World Series of Poker, pocketing $461,000, but falling short of bracelet #10.

Hellmuth had a slight edge in chips at one point Heads Up with Jeff Cabanillas. Cabanillas made some good calls, and got some good cards to gradually whittle Hellmuth down to 600,000 in chips compared to Cabanillas' 1.4 million. On the last hand, Hellmuth flopped 2nd pair, and went all-in. Cabanillas called with 3rd pair, a straight draw, and a flush draw. Hellmuth turned trips, but Cabanillas rivered a flush to win the bracelet and over $800,000.

Hellmuth has also finished 13th in the $3,000 Limit Hold Em event. The Turning Stone's best player, Al Krux, finished 35th in the $1,500 No Limit event. Hellmuth cashed in the same event.

That makes 50 WSOP cashes for Hellmuth, and 34 top 10 finishes for the 9 time bracelet winner. It's only a matter of time before he captures #10.

Me Being a Weak Mouse

This hands been bugging me for awhile. I played it weakly the whole way through and playing anything weakly is wrong unless its practically unbeatable.

I limped with Jack-Ten in late position. The flop was 9-8-T, giving me an open ended straight draw with top pair. I bet out the size of the pot, $8. I got one caller, then a raiser who made it $16 total. I called the $8 more as did the previous caller. The turn was a 3. The check-raiser checked, as did I. The caller went all-in for about $40. The check-raiser called. I knew the check-raiser had the same exact hand as me, Jack-10. I then folded. My logic was that I was risking $40 to, at best, split the $56 from the 3rd player in the hand.

I always say that playing great poker is being able to win pots in which you have the same hand as an opponent. The only way to do this is to be aggressive. I've been able to do this with hands like Ace-King, Ace-Queen, Ace-Jack, and even once with Queen-Ten against a calling station.

With the Jack-Ten situation, here's what I should have done. Since I knew my pair of tens were good, and I was up against the same hand, I could have won the pot by being aggressive. Instead, I lost $16 cuz I was too passive.

No matter what the river was, I can go all-in and win the pot. If we both hit our straight, I'll get a call. If we both hit trips or two pair, I get a call. Even if he calls me with just a pair of 10s with a Jack kicker, we still split up $56 between us, or $28 a piece. If he folds, the $56 from the 3rd player, along with the $16 from the other guy with Jack-Ten comes my way at the end of the hand.

There's no way he'd be able to call an all-in from a player as tight as me. Even though the move is a ludicrous overbet, which might give him reason to call, with my reputation (the guy had played with me for 6 hours at this point so he knew how tight was), I don't see how he could call. At that point, I had about $270 in chips in front of me. He had more, but it would have been a big blow to his stack. He simply couldn't call the bet. Nor could he re-raise it, obviously.

By folding, I lost $16 on the hand. Had I called the all-in on the turn, then pushed all-in on the river against the same hand, I would have profited $72. Once again, I wasn't the lion at the table I'd like to be, I was a fucking mouse.

A Mistake or Not?

I have Ace-Queen. I raise 6 times the blind, a standard raise at $100 NL. I get 3 callers, 2 of them before me, 1 after me. The flop is 5-10-2, with 2 hearts. I don't have much of a hand and only 2 backdoor draws. The first two players check, and I bet $15 hoping to take down the pot. The player to my right raises me to $45. The other two players fold.

I'm fairly confident that at that moment, my Ace high was good, and he was just trying to make a move on the pot. Either that, or he had top pair or something, in which case I might be able to push him off of the hand. He had shown a proficiency for bluffing, and I put him on a semi-bluff.

I asked him how many more chips he had. He had $61 after the $45 raise. In my opinion, my only move was to raise him or to fold. A call gives him an opportunity to catch or bluff again on the turn.

The only raise that was feasible was an all-in raise. I knew he would call an all-in and if I simply minimum re-raised him to $75 total, he was going to go all-in anyway.

All I had was Ace high, and 2 backdoor draws. However, I was pretty sure I had the best hand. However, I was also pretty sure I was up against a monster draw. Since I was unpaired, he not only had flush draw outs, he had outs to hit a pair. I figured it was about 50/50 and decided to fold and wait for a better spot. He showed King-7 of hearts so he had the monster draw, but I had the best hand.

The odds on the flop were 53.13% in my favor. I should have put him all-in.

Even though it was close to 50/50 that I lose an additional $106 on the hand, the pot odds were in my favor. Assuming he calls the all-in, which he would have, the pot would be $260. I'd be risking $106 to win $154. Those are odds of 1.45 to 1. I was a 1.13 to 1 favorite to win the hand.

In 1,000 instances of this hand after the flop, if I put him all-in, I lose 469 times, and win 531 times. In the times I lose, I lose $49,714. In the times I win, I make $81,774. That's $32,060 profit over 1,000 hands, or $32 a hand. Risking $106 to win, on average, $32 of profit isn't that much, but over the long run it adds up. I should have put him all-in.

I should have realized the benefits of my hand. Yes, the King-7 had a great deal of outs, but even if they hit, I would still have outs. If he hits the flush, I'm still 16% to win the hand. If he hits a pair of 7s, I'm still 11.4% to win the hand. If he hits a pair of Kings, I'm still 13.6% to win with an overcard and a gutshot straight draw.

Also, I have many cards in the deck that improve my hand. An Ace on the turn makes me 81.8% to win the hand. A Queen makes me 75.0% to win.

Even though 47.87% of the time I'd lose an extra $106 on the hand, the fold I made loses $27 100% of the time. Over 1,000 occurrences, that is losing $27,000. Granted, over the same number of instances, I'm only winning $32,000, but that is a $59,000 swing compared to folding. In other words, by folding, I saw an average down swing of $59 on my bankroll.

Mathematically, going all-in was the right decision to make. It also would have been beneficial in terms of gameplay. Here is why:

1. It shows an overly aggressive player with position on me that he won't be able to push me around. Even if I lose, he'll think twice before trying to force me out of hands when he only has a draw. He might only call the next time he has a drawing hand.

2. It shows the entire table that they will have difficulty pushing me around. Because I'm so tight, aggressive players sometimes can push me off of winning hands. This costs me money in the long run.

3. It shows the table that I will bet with hands that aren't the nuts. This will give me action in the long run. I often don't get action from good players even when they have great hands because of my tight reputation.

4. If I lose, I reload and my stack goes back to $100, only about $30 below what it was before the hand. If I win, my stack is at $260, which means I'd be $130 more powerful at the table. I could be more aggressive, chase more cards, and win bigger pots against the other big stacks at the table.